Abstract. The hash function JH [20] is one of the five finalists of the NIST SHA-3 hash competition. It has been recently tweaked for the final by increasing its number of rounds from 35.5 to 42. The previously best known results on JH were semi-free-start near-collisions up to 22 rounds using multi-inbound rebound attacks. In this paper we provide a new differential path on 32 rounds. Using this path, we are able to build various semi-free-start internal-state near-collisions and the maximum number of rounds that we achieved is up to 37 rounds on 986 bits. Moreover, we build distinguishers in the full 42-round internal permutation. These are, to our knowledge, the first results faster than generic attack on the full internal permutation of JH42, the finalist version. These distinguishers also apply to the compression function.
Introduction
A cryptographic hash function is a one way mathematical function that takes a message of arbitrary length as input and produces an output of fixed length, which is commonly called a fingerprint or message digest. Hash functions are fundamental components of many cryptographic applications such as digital signatures, authentication, key derivation, random number generation, etc. So, in terms of security any hash function should be preimage, second-preimage and collision resistant.
Most of the recent hash functions use either compression functions or internal permutations as building blocks in their design. In addition to the main properties mentioned above, some ideal properties should also be satisfied for the building blocks. This means that the algorithm should not have any structural weaknesses and should not be distinguishable from a random oracle. The absence of these properties on building blocks may not impact the security claims of the hash function immediately but it helps to point out the potential flaws in the design.
Since many of the hash standards [16, 19] have been broken in recent years, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a competition to replace the current standard SHA-2 with a new algorithm SHA-3. The hash function JH [20] , designed by Hongjun Wu, is one of the five finalists of this competition. It is a very simple design and efficient in both software and hardware. JH supports four different hash sizes: 224, 256, 384 and 512-bit. It has been tweaked from the second round to the final round by increasing its number of rounds from 35.5 to 42. The new version is called JH42.
Related Work:
We recall here the previously best known results on JH. A marginal preimage attack on the 512-bits hash function with a complexity in time and memory of 2 507 was presented in [1] . Several multi-inbound rebound attacks were presented in [15] , providing in particular a semi-free-start collision for 16 rounds with a complexity of 2 190 in time and 2 104 in memory and a semifree-start near-collision for 22 rounds of compression function with a complexity of 2 168 in time and 2 143 in memory. In [12, Sec.4 .1], improved complexities for these rebound attacks were provided: 2 97 in time and memory for the 16 round semi-free-start collision and 2 96 in time and memory for the 22 rounds semi-freestart near-collision for compression function.
Our Contributions: In this paper we apply, as in [15] , a multi-inbound rebound attack, using 6 inbounds that cover rounds from 0 to 32. We first find partial solutions for the differential part of the path by using the ideas from [13] . Due to increased number of rounds compared with the previous attacks, the differential path will have several highly active peaks, instead of one as in [15] . This means that, while in the previous attacks finding the whole solution for the path could be easily done without contradicting any of the already fixed values from the inbounds, now finding the complete solution is the most expensive part. We propose here an algorithm that allows us to find whole solutions for rounds from 4 to 26 with an average complexity of 2 64 . By repeating the algorithm, the attack can be started from round 0 and extended up to 37 rounds for building semi-free-start near-collisions on the internal state, since we have enough degrees of freedom. Based on the same differential characteristic, we also present distinguishers for 42 rounds of the internal permutation which is the first distinguisher on internal permutation faster than generic attack to the best of our knowledge. We summarize our main results in Table 1 .
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we give a brief description of the JH hash function, its properties and an overview of the rebound attack. In Section 3, we first describe the main idea of our attack and then give the semifree internal near-collision results on the tweaked version JH42. Based on this results, we describe a distinguisher in Section 4 for the full internal permutation, that also applies to the full compression function. Finally, we conclude the paper and summarize our results in Section 5.
Preliminaries

The JH42 Hash Function
The hash function JH is an iterative hash function that accepts message blocks of 512 bits and produces a hash value of 224, 256, 384 and 512 bits. The message is padded to be a multiple of 512 bits. The bit '1' is appended to the end of the message, followed by 384 − 1 + (−l mod 512) zero bits. Finally, a 128-bit block is appended which is the length of the message, l, represented in big endian form. Note that this scheme guarantees that at least 512 additional bits are padded. In each iteration, the compression function F d , given in Figure 1 , is used to update the 2 d+2 bits of the state H i−1 as follows:
where H i−1 is the previous chaining value and M i is the current message block. The compression function F d is defined as follows:
Here, E d is a permutation and is composed of an initial grouping of bits followed by 6(d − 1) rounds, plus a final degrouping of bits. The grouping operation arranges bits in a way that the input to each S-Box has two bits from the message part and two bits from the chaining value. In each round, the input is The initial hash value H 0 is set depending on the message digest size. The first two bytes of H −1 are set as the message digest size, and the rest of the bytes of H −1 are set as zero. Then, H 0 = F d (H −1 , 0). Finally, the message digest is generated by truncating H N where N is the number of blocks in the padded message, i.e, the last X bits of H N are given as the message digest of JH-X where X = 224, 256, 384 and 512.
The official submitted version of JH42 has d = 8 and so the number of rounds is 42 and the size of the internal state is 1024 bits. Then, from now on, we will only consider E 8 . For a more detailed information we refer to the specification of JH [20] .
Properties of the Linear Transformation L
Since the linear transformation L implements a [4, 2, 3] MDS code, any difference in one of the words of the input (output) will result in a difference in two words of the output (input). For a fixed L transformation, if one tries all possible 2 16 pairs, the number of pairs satisfying the condition 2 → 1 or 1 → 2 is 3840, which gives a probability of 3840/65536 ≈ 2 −4.09 . Note that, if the words are arranged in a way that they will be both active this probability increases to 3840/57600 ≈ 2 −3.91 . For the latter case, if both words remain active (2 → 2), the probability is 49920/57600 ≈ 2 −0.21 .
Observations on the Compression Function
The grouping of bits at the beginning of the compression function assures that the input of every first layer S-Box is xor-ed with two message bits. Similarly, the output of each S-Box is xor-ed with two message bits. Therefore, for a random non-zero 4-bit difference, the probability that this difference is related to a message is 3/15 ≈ 2 −2.32 . The bit-slice implementation of F d uses d − 1 different round functions. The main difference between these round functions is the permutation function. In each round permutation, the odd bits are swapped by 2 r mod (d − 1) where r is the round number. Therefore, for the same input passing through multiple rounds, the output is identical to the output of the original round function for the α · (d − 1)-th round where α is any integer.
The Rebound Attack
The rebound attack was introduced by Mendel et al. [10] . The two main steps of the attack are called inbound phase and outbound phase. In the inbound phase, the available degrees of freedom are used to connect the middle rounds by using the match-in-the-middle technique and in the outbound phase connected truncated differentials are computed in both forward and backward direction.
This attack has been first used for the cryptanalysis of reduced versions of Whirlpool and Grøstl, and then extended to obtain distinguishers for the full Whirlpool compression function [6] . Later, linearized match-in-the-middle and start-from-the-middle techniques are introduced by Mendel et al. [9] to improve the rebound attack. Moreover, a sparse truncated differential path and state is used in the attack on LANE by Matusiewicz et al. [8] rather than using a full active state in the matching part of the attack. Then, these techniques were used to improve the results on AES-based algorithms in the following papers: [2, 3, 5, 11, 14, 17, 18] .
Semi-free-start internal near-collisions
In this section, we first present an outline for the rebound attack on reduced round versions of JH for all hash sizes. We use a differential characteristic that covers 32 rounds, and apply the start-from-the-middle technique by using six inbound phases with partially active states. We first describe how to solve the multi-inbound phase for the active bytes. Contrary to previous attacks on JH, we now have more fixed values from the inbound phases. So, in order to find a complete solution, we need to merge these fixed values without contradicting any of them. Therefore, we describe next how to match the passive bytes. Finally, we analyze the outbound part. Multi-inbound Phase: The multi-inbound phase of the attack covers 32 rounds and is composed of two parts. In the first part, we apply the start-fromthe-middle-technique six times for rounds 0 − 4, 4 − 10, 10 − 16, 16 − 20, 20 − 26 and 26 − 32. In the second part, we connect the resulting active bytes (hence the corresponding state values) by a match-in-the-middle step. The number of active S-Boxes in each of the sets is:
Matching the Active Bytes
Here, the arrows represent the direction of the computations for the inbound phases and for a detailed sketch we refer to Figure 2 . We start from the middle and then propagate outwards by computing the cross-product 3 of the sets and using the filtering conditions. For each inbound we try all possible 2 16 pairs in Step 0. The number of sets, the bit length of the middle values (size) of each list, and the number of filtering conditions on words followed by the number of pairs in each set are given in Table 2 . The complexities given in the Table 2 are not optimized yet, we will describe the improved complexities later in Section 3.1.
Merging Inbound Phases: The remaining pairs at inbound i are stored on list L i . Connecting the six lists is performed in three steps as follows: Improving the complexity of finding a solution for the differential part:
We have described how to obtain the existing 2 40 solutions for the differential part. We are going to describe here a better way of doing the inbounds, as proposed in [12, Sec.4 in memory. As in our further analysis we will just use one solution (and not 2 40 ) for the differential part, we will adapt the values being able to finally reduce the complexity of this part of the attack to 2 59.6 in time and 2 57.6 in memory. This memory is the memory bottleneck of all the analysis presented in this paper.
1. We consider the six inbounds as described in the previous section, with the difference that, for inbounds 2, 3, 5 and 6 we will not perform the last step, The complexity of obtaining one partial solution for rounds from 0 to 32 is dominated by Steps 2 − 4 of the algorithm. As a result, the complexity of matching the active bytes becomes 2 59.6 in time and 2 57.6 in memory.
Matching The Passive Bytes
In Figure 4 , colored boxes denote the S-boxes whose values have already been fixed from the inbound phases. Note that, we have not treated the passive bits yet (i.e., found the remaining values that would complete the path). We will propose a way of finding 2 32 solutions that verify the path from rounds 4 to 26 with time complexity 2 96 and memory complexity 2 51.58 . This can be done in three steps as follows: n, o, p) . In Figure 4 , the fixed bits coming from round 20 are denoted by green lines and the ones of the first inbound phase are denoted in blue " ". Note that the three parts m, n, o are identical, while p is different since there are some differences and some additional fixed values in it.
We fix the parts m and n to some values that satisfy all the conditions of the fixed bits in rounds 19 
Semi-free-start near-collisions up to 32 rounds: Up to now, we have found solutions for the passive bytes from rounds 4 − 26. If we want a solution for the path from round 0 to round 26, we will have to repeat the previous procedure of matching the passive bytes 2 16 times (as the probability of passing from round 0 to 4 is 2 −48 and we have 2 32 pairs). Then, we can find a solution for rounds 0 − 26 with complexity 2 112 in time. In order to extend this result to 32 rounds, we have to repeat the previous procedure 2
192 times (since we have 64 and 128 bits of condition from rounds 26 and 27 respectively). Therefore, the complexity for finding a complete solutions for rounds from 0 to 32 is 2 112 · 2 192 = 2 304 in time.
Note that, we still have enough degrees of freedom. In step 1, we started with 768 bits (128 × 6 from the groups a − f ) in round 14 and matched 192 bits (32 × 6 for A − F ) in round 10. In Step 2, we have 48 bits in round 16 coming from the fourth inbound phase and we matched another 240 bits from the fifth inbound phase in round 19. So in total we have 768 − 192 − 48 − 240 = 288 bits of degrees of freedom remaining.
Outbound Phase:
The outbound phase of the attack is composed of 5 rounds in the forward direction. A detailed schema of this trail is shown in Figure 5 in appendix, and for the pairs that satisfy the inbound phase, we expect to see the following differential trail in the outbound phase:
Semi-free-start near-collisions up to 37 rounds: For 32 rounds of the JH compression function, we obtain a semi-free-start near-collision for 1002 bits. We can simply increase the number of rounds by proceeding forwards in the outbound phase. Note that, we have an additional probability of 2 −32 × 2
−16
coming from the eight filtering conditions in round 34 and the four filtering conditions in round 35. Thus, the complexity of the active part of the attack remains the same: 2 59.6 in time and 2 57.6 in memory. This is the case as one solution for the differential part is enough for the attack, as it will have different values at the bits with conditions in the outbound part when the passive part is modified. The complexity of the passive part becomes 2 304 · 2 48 = 2 352 in time and 2
51.58 in memory. The details can be seen in Table 3 . We also take into account the colliding bits that we obtain at the output of the compression function after the final degrouping with the differences from the message. 
Distinguishers on JH
Indifferentiability is considered to be a desirable property of any secure hash function design. Moreover, for many of the designs, the indifferentiability proofs for the mode of operation are based on the assumption that the underlying permutation (function) is ideal (i.e., random permutation). This is the case of the indifferentiability proof of JH [1] , that supposes that E d is a random permutation.
In this section, we present a distinguisher for E 8 showing that it is distinguishable form a random permutation. Using the differential path that we presented in the previous section, we can build the distinguishers on the full 42 rounds of the internal permutation E 8 with no additional complexity. As a result of our distinguisher, the proof from [1] does not apply to JH as the assumption of E 8 behaving like random does not hold. Next, we explain how these distinguishers on the internal permutation can be easily extended to distinguishers on the compression function.
There exists also a known trivial distinguisher on the construction of the compression function of JH: If the chaining value has a difference that can be cancelled by the message block, then the output will have a difference directly related to the one coming from the message block. This implies that both the message and the chaining values have differences. Contrary to the trivial one, our compression function distinguisher exploits the properties of the internal permutation and only needs differences in the message or in the chaining value.
Distinguishers on the reduced round internal permutation
Let us remark here briefly that if we find solutions for rounds 4 to 20, and then let them spread freely backward (difference in 64 bits) and forward (difference in 256 bits), we can obtain a distinguisher for 26 rounds with a much lower complexity: 2 59.6 in time and 2 57.6 in memory (the cost of the differential part). As in this paper the aim is reaching a higher number of rounds, we do not go further into the details.
Distinguishers on the full internal permutation
In the previous sections we showed that a solution for 37 rounds can be obtained with a time complexity of 2 352 in time and 2 57.6 in memory. In Figure 5 from the appendix, we see how these active words diffuse to the state after 42 rounds with probability one. Therefore, before the degrouping operation we have 64 active and 192 passive words in the state. The number of active and passive bits still remain the same after the degrouping operation. It is important to remark that the positions of the active bits are fixed, also after the degrouping operation.
We can then build a distinguisher that will distinguish the 42-round permutation E 8 from a random permutation using this path. This distinguisher aims at finding a pair of input states (A, A ) such that E 8 (A) ⊕ E 8 (A ) collide in the 768 bits mentioned above. Let A ⊕ A = ∆ 1 correspond to the input difference of the differential path, then |∆ 1 | = 8 bits. Similarly, let B = E 8 (A) and B = E 8 (A ), then the output difference is B ⊕ B = ∆ 2 where |∆ 2 | = 256.
In the case of a random function, we calculate the complexity of such a distinguisher as follows: We fix the values of the passive bits in the input; but not the ones of the active bits. Then, we have 2 |∆1| possibilities for the values from the active bits. We compute the output of E 8 for each one of these values and store them in a list. From this list we can obtain
pairs with the given input difference pattern. The probability of satisfying the desired output difference pattern is 2 |∆2|−1024 for each pair, so we repeat the procedure with a new value for the input passive bits until we find a solution. The time complexity of finding such an input pair will be:
Instead, in our case the complexity of finding such an input pair is the complexity of finding a solution for the path, that is 2 352 in time and 2 57.6 in memory. Another distinguisher of E 8 can be built if we consider the scenario where the differential path for rounds 0 − 4 does not need to be verified, i.e., |∆ 1 | = 64. In this case, we consider that from round 4 to 0 we obtain the differences that propagate with probability one. Therefore, the matching of the passive part does not need to be repeated 2 208 times but only 2 160 (as we do not need 2 48 extra repetitions for verifying rounds 0 to 4). The complexity of this distinguisher will then be 2 304 , and provides a pair of inputs A and A that produce an output with 768 colliding bits as the ones represented in Figure 5 from appendix. 
Distinguishers on the full compression function
We should emphasize that our distinguishers on E 8 can be easily converted to a distinguisher on the full compression function of JH42. We only need to xor this message difference to the output of E 8 as specified. For our first distinguisher, the input difference is already arranged such that we only have difference in the message. These active bits coming from the message coincide with the active bits in the output at the xor operation. As a result, we have the same 768 passive bits. The same applies for our second distinguisher when we have differences only in the chaining value.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented semi-free-start internal near-collisions up to 37 rounds by using rebound attack techniques. We first obtained a 960-bit semifree-start near-collision for 26 rounds of the JH compression function with a time complexity of 2 112 and a memory complexity of 2 57.6 . We then extended this to 986-bit semi-free-start near-collision for 37 rounds by repeating the algorithm. Time complexity of the attack is increased to 2 352 and the memory complexity remains the same. We also presented semi-free-start near-collision results for intermediate rounds 26 − 37 in Table 3 . Our findings are summarized in Table 1 .
Even more, we have presented distinguishers on the full 42 rounds of the internal permutation E 8 of the tweaked SHA-3 finalist JH. The best distinguisher has a time complexity of 2 304 in time and 2 57.6 in memory and provides solutions for the differential path on the 42 rounds. Obtaining such a pair of inputs producing a same truncated differential in the output for a random function would cost 2 705 in time. Our internal permutation distinguishers can easily be extended to compression function distinguishers with the same complexity.
Although our results do not present a threat to the security of the JH hash function, they invalidate the JH indifferentiability proof presented in [1] . 
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